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Abstract
The size of tax evasion and fraud appears to be increasing steadily in the
EU. To a certain extent, the completion of Single Market has further
encouraged firms’ and households’ evasive behaviour in paying value
added taxes in the EU Member States, whereas such efforts have
traditionally been most pronounced in the field of corporate and personal
income taxation. This study primarily deals with the quantification of the
VAT evasion and fraud in the EU. On the basis of the national accounts
data, it suggests a novel way of estimating the annual amount of
hypothetical VAT revenues for the individual EU countries. The relation
between the calculated hypothetical and the (current) collected revenues in
a fiscal year largely determines the extent of VAT evasion and fraud of a
country, when the time-lag problem between the creation of tax liability and
the VAT collection in cash terms can be adjusted.
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Although there are controversies existing about the definition of tax evasion and the
shadow economy, their size seems to be growing steadily in the EU and in other OECD
countries (Schneider and Enste, 2000; Schneider, 2000b; OECD, 1997). In particular,
the burden of direct and indirect taxation, the complexity of the entire tax and social
transfer system as well as the intensity of government regulation have been empirically
identified as the major causes of encouraging such illegal or hidden economic activities.
To a certain extent, the recent implementation of the Single Market appears to have in-
creasingly stimulated firms’ and households’ evading behaviour of paying value added
taxes in the EU Member States, while the tax evasion and fraud has traditionally been
most serious in the field of corporate and personal income taxation.
1 In other words, the
abolition of the border controls for intra-EU trade accompanied by the less well-
established administrative co-operations of the (rather problematic) nation-specific EDP
(electronic data processing) control systems has probably provided further opportunities
to easily realise their VAT evasion efforts in the EU (Parsche, Steinherr and Waller,
1996).
2
                                           
1  In OECD countries general consumption taxes, especially value added tax (VAT), belong to
the fastest growing revenue sources together with contributions to finance social security.
The former tax item produced ca. 18% of total tax revenues in 1998, compared with only
12% in the mid-1960s (OECD, 1999).
2  VAT control is still a national question in the EU. Yet, the Commission is highly interested
in effective taxation and control in all Member States, for VAT contributes to the EU budget.
Today, the need for audits under the transitional VAT system is much greater than before
1993, when cross-border transactions were scrutinised by border controls. However, insuffi-
cient financial resources are presently provided by the individual countries for this purpose.
In addition, EU Member States have kept their own (nation-specific) VAT control methodol-
ogy in spite of the creation of the internal market. Furthermore, some countries and regions
are unwilling to improve the tax control, for this could reduce competitive advantages of in-
digenous firms against those foreign companies with higher tax compliance. Nowadays the
tasks regarding the administration and control on VAT matters are increasingly transferred to
local and regional authorities. Emphasising the so-called subsidiarity principle, this develop-
ment can be positively interpreted as a necessary measure to enhance the control efficiency,
since the local authorities have better information about local taxpayers. On the other hand,3
Different types of empirical methods have been recently adopted to measure the size
of tax evasion and informal economy, which range from a direct survey to a sophisti-
cated, dynamic econometric model. All these methods have advantages and shortcom-
ings at the same time (Schneider, 2000a and 2000b; Schneider and Enste, 2000; Lippert
and Walker, 1997; Feige, 1989). According to Schneider (2000a) and Thomas (1992),
these approaches can be largely differentiated into three:
•   micro approaches based on surveys (e.g. about income declared for tax purposes)
among taxpayers and tax auditing (Isachsen, Klovland and Strom, 1982; Mogensen,
Kvist, Körmendi and Pedersen, 1995),
•   macroeconomic approaches calculating the discrepancies between income and ex-
penditure statistics (MacAfee, 1980; Del Boca, 1981) as well as between the official
(i.e. registered) and actual labour force (Contini, 1981); the monetary approach based
on the Fisher quantity equation (Feige, 1979; 1996); the popular currency demand
method measuring the correlation between the currency demand and the tax pressure
(Tanzi, 1982); and the physical input method observing relations between (official
and unofficial) GDP and electricity consumption (Kaufmann and Kaliberda, 1996;
Johnson, Kaufmann and Schleifer, 1997; Lacko, 1998), and
•   (dynamic) multiple-indicators and multiple-causes econometric models which con-
sider various macroeconomic determinants for creating a shadow economy (i.e. the
burden of taxation and regulation, tax morality, etc.) and attempt to explain their ef-
fects in the development of production, labour and money markets simultaneously
(Aigner, Schneider and Ghosh, 1988; Schneider, 2000a; Frey and Weck-Hannemann,
1984).
Unlike the larger share of conventional empirical analyses which emphasise the pre-
dominance of direct taxation and measure the total size of tax evasion for the entire do-
mestic economy of a country, this study primarily deals with the narrow aspect of tax
evasion in the specific area of EU value added taxation. On the basis of the national
accounts data, it suggests a novel way of estimating the annual amount of hypothetical
VAT revenues of the individual EU countries, which are assumed to be the maximum
                                                                                                                               
such an assignment could more easily lead to permitting tax evasion and fraud on the local
level (Europäische Kommission, 1995, 1997 and 2000).4
level of VAT revenues the country can ideally collect in a fiscal year. When the mis-
match in timing between the creation of tax liability and the VAT collection in cash
terms can be adjusted, the relation between the hypothetical and the (current) collected
revenues indicates the tax collection performance of a country, from which the extent of
VAT evasion and fraud (as well as suspension of tax claims caused by bankruptcies)
can also be derived for the country.
Method of Calculating VAT Evasion Based on National Accounts Data
As mentioned above, the extent of the VAT evasion and fraud in the individual EU
countries is largely determined by the difference between the hypothetical and the col-
lected VAT revenues in a given fiscal year. The latter can be easily obtained from the
official statistics, while the former should be estimated for comparison purposes. For the
calculation of the hypothetical VAT revenues of a country, national accounts data and
input-output tables published by the national statistical office, annual reports of various
state-owned companies and other relevant statistics are adopted as the VAT base.
3 In
particular, the statistics and data on private consumption, intermediate consumption and
investment of central and local governments apparently play the most important role for
the assessment, together with those on business performance of banks and insurance
companies which are not entitled to deduct input VAT.
In other words,
                                           
3  To a certain extent shadow activities are currently included in the national accounts of the
individual EU countries. Yet, the methods for correcting official statistics for this purpose
still vary from one country to another. The European System of Accounts (ESA) of 1995 pre-
scribes to adopt all possible approaches to quantify (implicit and explicit) additions so that
illegal and hidden economic activities can be exhaustively included in GDP. Even if this goal
were achieved, the exact share of shadow activities would not seem to be easily identified. In
general, national statistical offices can hardly provide detailed information on the part of
GDP attributed to these shadow activities. Only some sector-specific, explicit additions are
relatively well captured in the relevant statistics and can be separated rather easily.5
                  Collected VAT revenues
(1) Tax collection performance ratio = ————————————————— .
                     Calculated hypothetical VAT revenues
Hence,
(2) Ratio of VAT evasion = 1 – Tax collection performance ratio .
In the quantification of hypothetical VAT revenues, for example, the component
‘private consumption’ of the national accounts data is differentiated into taxable and
non-taxable (or tax-exempted) categories. As indicated in the national VAT law, the
normal and the reduced rates are then allocated systematically corresponding to the in-
dividual items of private consumption, from which one can calculate the hypothetical
VAT revenues for this area. Yet, it should be borne in mind that the national accounts
data on private consumption are generally expressed in gross terms, which means that
these values already contain the VAT amounts. As a consequence, the so-called gross
VAT rates are used for the calculation purpose instead of the net tax rates.
The gross VAT rate is defined as
      Net VAT rate
(3) Gross VAT rate = ——————————— .
  1 + Net VAT rate
In the case that a consumption position cannot be entirely assigned to a VAT rate but
encompasses a number of sub-items which are subject to varied tax rates, a weighted
gross rate is implied. The weighting scale for the total position is usually derived from
the different shares of the sub-items in this consumption category.6
Table 1 Value added tax rates in the EU Member States
(Net) VAT rates in 1996 
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# In this study the quantification is carried out for the years 1994, 1995 and 1996. For this
reason, the 1996 VAT rates are indicated here.
* In general the reduced rates are imposed on the consumption of agricultural products,
foodstuffs, books, and certain medical and pharmaceutical products and equipment as well as
paintings and antiques. Exports are subject to the zero rate.
** Since 1
 April 1999 16%
*** Since 1
 January 1998 only two reduced rates: 8% and 17%
Source: Mennel and Förster (1999), Steuern in Europa, Amerika und Asien, Herne/Berlin.
Analogously one can also measure the input VAT burden of governments, banks and
insurance companies, private non-profit organisations as well as those activities and7
industries like private lessons, renting houses and apartments, market-oriented health
services, postal services, lottery, etc. which are, due to the tax-free (or exempt) sales of
goods and services, not subject to the input tax deduction in most cases. Special tax re-
gimes like the flat rate taxation for farmers, the taxation of margins for travel agencies,
and the SME-specific rule cause some additional efforts in collecting and elaborating
relevant statistics, for these firms are also allowed to opt for the normal taxation. Fur-
thermore, it should be additionally taken into account that in many countries the input
tax deduction is (fully or partially) limited also for taxable private firms when purchas-
ing certain services and durable (investment) goods like cars and corresponding expen-
ditures for maintenance and repair work as well as gasoline.
Some quantification difficulties may arise when the territorial scope of the VAT law
does not tally with the territorial reporting area covered by the national accounts (see the
case of Åland Island with the mainland of Finland). The same applies when the VAT
law provides for tax rates that differ by region (see the case of Corsica in France). In
both cases, a precise quantification is possible only if corresponding regional statistics
are available. An additional measuring problem can emerge when certain items are re-
corded in the national accounts which are not connected with purchases of relevance for
VAT purposes (e.g. imputed rents for house or apartment owners or additions for
shadow economy), and in particular when these items are not indicated separately but
incorporated into other items, with the result that a recalculation is hardly possible.
A more serious problem for the quantification of VAT evasion based on national ac-
counts data is caused by the discrepancy between the tax revenues on an origin basis
(i.e. the creation of tax liability) and the collected cash revenues in a given period of
time. The latter differs from the former owing mainly to the factors like payment peri-
ods, back payments and deferred payments. In other words, the calculation of hypo-
thetical revenues for a fiscal year is made on the basis of current national accounts data,
which delivers, therefore, the sum of VAT revenues on an origin basis for the same
year. In practice, however, the VAT imposed on households consumption (and on the
investment and intermediate consumption of governments, financial institutions, private
non-profit organisations, etc.) made at the end of December of the preceding year, for
example, can only be effectively (i.e. in cash terms) transferred by firms to tax authori-8
ties in January of the current year. At present this type of formal VAT collecting process
usually takes approximately a month (see e.g. the case in Germany). As a consequence,
a significant share of tax revenues actually originated from the purchases of goods and
services in December of the preceding year is (in cash terms) collected later and re-
corded as the revenues of January of the current fiscal year. For the adjustment of such a
time-lag problem the January revenue value of the individual years is thus particularly
relevant. Since the monthly amounts of collected tax revenues are hardly available for
the investigated EU Member States, a tenth of the preceding year’s revenues on an ori-
gin basis is simply allocated for all countries (except Spain) as the part of the corre-
sponding type of VAT revenues for the current fiscal year.
4 Furthermore, an additional
deduction of 1% of revenues on an origin base of a fiscal year is made in the quantifica-
tion to adequately consider the significance of suspending tax claims caused by bank-
ruptcy and other types of tax waiving of the same year.
5
Major Findings of the Empirical Analyses on VAT Collection Per-
formance and VAT Evasion in the EU
Table 2 and 3 summarise the tax collection performance ratio and the VAT evasion ratio
for the selected EU Member States in the period 1994-1996. For France, Italy and the
UK the corresponding values for the years between 1991 and 1993 are adopted for the
comparative purposes (Parsche, Steinherr and Waller, 1996). Among those investigated
nations, Italy, Spain, Greece and Belgium had the highest VAT evasion and fraud rates
                                           
4  Spain is an exception. Regardless of reduced or normal rates, this country increased its VAT
rate by 1% in 1995. Due to the three month tax payment period, the collected VAT revenues
in 1995 contain the first quarter the revenues from the lower taxes (3%, 6% and 15%) and the
rest from the higher ones (4%, 7% and 16%). The corresponding time-lag adjustment is made
on the basis of this fact.
5  Such types of statistical adjustment and deductions can be done more accurately by national
statistical offices on the basis of nation-specific method and period of tax payment, seasonal
fluctuation of consumption and tax income as well as insight information on bankruptcies
and other sorts of tax waiving.9
in the observed years which are derived from the lowest tax collection performance fig-
ures. By contrast, tax evasion appears to be less serious in the Netherlands, Denmark
and the UK, which have recently enjoyed tax collection performance values of around
95% in the same period of time. By and large, these empirical findings correspond well
to the major outcomes of the previous studies by Schneider and Enste (2000) and
Schneider (2000b) which measure the size of shadow economy (as a percentage of offi-
cial GDP) in advanced economies based on the so-called currency demand approach.
Furthermore, while the ratio of VAT evasion and fraud more or less stagnated on a
high level in Italy and Greece, the same ratio tended to slightly decrease in the low tax
evasion countries like Denmark and the Netherlands between 1994 and 1996. Germany
suffered from a rapid growth of VAT evasion in the three subsequent years after the
introduction of Single Market in 1993.
6 A positive correlation between the extent of tax
evasion and the level of tax rates is less distinct in the investigated years (see the low
evasion ratio of Denmark with the high normal rate of 25% and the vice versa for Spain
with 16%).
7
                                           
6  If this trend has maintained in Germany, the annual sum of tax evasion and fraud is antici-
pated to have recently reached higher than 20 billion DM in the area of value added taxation.
7  To a certain extent, this empirical finding conflicts with the general argument for broadening
the tax base and lowering tax rates to reduce the economic incentive to go underground.
Other popular measures aimed at reducing the size of tax evasion and fraud are (a) simplify-
ing the administration of various taxes, (b) considering tough enforcement, (c) increasing in-
ternational co-operation for sharing tax information and (d) building a better information
base for tax evasion with resources of statistical office, ministries of finance and tax authori-
ties, etc.10
Table 2 Tax collection performance ratio in the selected EU Member States


























































* For the countries France, Italy and the United Kingdom, annual hypothetical VAT
revenues were calculated by Parsche, Steinherr and Waller (1996) for the period 1991-
1993. Their calculation was based on the old national statistical system prior to the in-
troduction of the European System of Accounts (ESA) in 1995, in which these countries
compiled and classified economic data according to their own rules and definitions.
Compared to the cases in France and Italy, the size of shadow economy was less suffi-
ciently considered and included in the UK when calculating the country’s national ac-
counts data for the years between 1991 and 1993.
Sources: National accounts and tax revenue statistics of the investigated countries; Eu-
rostat (1997), National Accounts ESA 1980-1995, Luxembourg/Brussels; Calculations
of the Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich.11



























































* See Table 2.
Sources: National accounts and tax revenue statistics of the investigated countries; Eu-
rostat (1997), National Accounts ESA 1980-1995, Luxembourg/Brussels; Calculations
of the Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich.
Conclusion
In recent years VAT has remained as one of the major revenue sources in the EU. This
study introduces a new method of measuring the tax evasion and fraud in the specific
area of VAT. Its extent is basically determined by the comparison of the size of calcu-
lated hypothetical revenues to that of the collected cash revenues in a fiscal year. In ad-
dition the time-lag problem between the creation of tax liability and the VAT collection
in cash terms is adjusted in a systematic way.12
In the field of value added taxation in the EU, countries like Italy, Spain, Greece and
Belgium particularly suffered from the serious tax evasion and fraud in the investigated
period between 1994 and 1996.
8 By contrast, the average tax collection performance
ratio reached fortunately over 95% in the Netherlands and Denmark. Germany had the
fastest growth of VAT evasion after the introduction of Single Market in 1993. A posi-
tive correlation between the tax evasion and the level of VAT tax rates was less signifi-
cant in the EU. In general, co-operative efforts and harmonised measures for the tax
control and enforcement as well as the establishment of a better information base for tax
evasion appear to be required in the EU in order to enhance the VAT collection per-
formance in the individual countries.
To be sure this type of quantification depends very strongly on the quality of national
accounts data, input-output tables and other relevant official statistics as well as VAT
revenue data available for the individual countries. Improvement of their quality and
availability is still necessary in the context of the EU-wide co-operative network among
national statistical offices and tax authorities. Such statistical upgrading will make not
only the measuring process more convenient but also the outcomes more accurate.
A systematic, long-term oriented analysis is required to deliver the more comprehen-
sive view on the general trend of VAT evasion in the EU and its change caused by the
introduction of the Single Market in 1993, which cannot be done without the elaboration
of relevant data for the years prior to this event. Such future empirical research will also
provide opportunities to examine the impact of a number of national VAT reforms
and/or the EU-wide tax harmonisation efforts on the size of tax collection performance
and VAT evasion and fraud in the EU Member States.
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